This appendix presents the following extensions: we clarify the importance of capturing betrayal aversion Zeckhauser 2004, Bohnet et al. 2008) in our model of social preferences; we establish the robustness of our results to small perturbations in social preferences and in the cost of transfers; finally, we outline a simple model of endogenously incomplete contracts using the model of informal justice developed in this paper as a building block.
depend on side information. Indeed, given a candidate transfer function T , define
Transfer scheme T U is the expectation of transfer T conditional on payoff outcome u = (u A u P ). For any T , we have that
By convexity of | · | and Jensen's inequality, we obtain that
It follows that informal incentives derived from value function V need only depend on payoff outcome u. In this model, the principal cares only about average inequality and does not care about whether she is punishing a player A who took selfish action D. As a result, transfers never depend on side information x.
S.A.2 Robustness
Some of our modeling choices, such as the use of linear inequality-averse preferences à la Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or the use of linear transfer costs −λ|T z |, make the analysis tractable but induce corner solutions. We show that our analysis is in fact robust to small perturbations in the environment. Let c(T ) = λ|T | denote the reference deadweight cost of transfers paid by the transferring party. We consider sequences of social preferences n ( u u) and transfer cost functions c n such that lim n→∞ n − ∞ = lim n→∞ c n − c ∞ = 0, where · ∞ denotes the uniform norm. We denote by T π n the transfer scheme solving
Lemma S.A.1 (Continuity). Consider any compact set included in the interior of ({C D}). Uniformly over π ∈ , transfer schemes (T π n ) n≥0 converge to T π under the L 1 norm:
Proof. The difficulty here is that we are working with an infinite set of states z ∈ Z, so that the space of possible transfer functions is infinite dimensional and, therefore, not compact under the L 1 norm. Indeed, if instead we were working with a finite set of states Z, Lemma S.A.1 would follow immediately from the uniqueness of optimal transfers and Berge's theorem of the maximum. Proving an extension is possible in our case but requires some work. The proposed proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists > 0 and a sequence (π n ) n∈N such that for all n ≥ 0,
By compactness of , we can assume that the sequence (π n ) n∈N converges to π ∞ ∈ . In addition, we know from Lemma 4 that T π is continuous in π under the L 1 norm. Hence, up to extraction of a subsequence, we can assume that
For concision, we denote T n = T π n n . It is immediate that V n (π n T ) converges uniformly over T to V (π ∞ T ). Since T n solves max T V n (π n T ), we obtain that V (π ∞ T n ) converges to V (π ∞ T π ∞ ) as n grows large. Given that max T V (π ∞ T ) has a unique solution, it is reasonable to expect that this result and (S.1) should lead to a contradiction. The only difficulty is that (T n ) n≥0 need not have a converging subsequence under the L 1 norm.
Consider the sequence of expected inequality (E[ u T n |C] E[ u T n |D]) n≥0 under transfer schemes (T n ) n≥0 . Up to extraction of a subsequence, we can assume that this sequence converges to values ( C D ). Consider first the case where
The set of such solutions, parameterized by ( C D ν), is compact under the L 1 norm. 1 Take ν to 0 and consider a sequence of solutions (S.2) converging to a limit transfer scheme T ∞ under the L 1 norm. The fact that T ∞ solves max T V (π ∞ T ) and the fact that
contradict the fact that max T V (π ∞ T ) has a unique maximizer. Consider now the case where
The set of such solutions is compact and using the fact that max V (π ∞ T ) has a unique solution, it must be that as ν goes to 0, T ν converges to T π ∞ under the L 1 norm. Consider the Lagrangian L(z T z ) corresponding to (S.3). It can be written in the form
where L 0 is a constant. Let μ ∞ C and μ ∞ D denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with problem max T V (π ∞ T ), as described by Lemma 3. Given that T ν must converge to T π ∞ under the L 1 norm, it must be that maximizers of Lagrangian (S.4) converge to maximizers of Lagrangian (11) (see Appendix A.2). Hence it must be that lim ν→0 μ ν
For any value ν > 0, for n large enough, T n satisfies the constraints in (S.3). We obtain that, by construction,
There exists a function ρ z > 0 such that for ν small enough, for a.e. z,
We have that for all n and ν,
Since this holds for ν arbitrarily close to 0, we obtain that the sequence V (π ∞ T n ) remains bounded strictly below V (π ∞ T π ∞ ) even as n grows large-a contradiction.
Hence T π n converges to T π uniformly over π ∈ under the L 1 norm.
Since player A's expected payoffs from different actions are continuous in T π , this implies that any sequence of equilibria (π n T π n ) n≥0 of perturbed games admits a subsequence that converges to an equilibrium of the unperturbed game. Inversely, assume that (π 0 T π 0 ) is an equilibrium of the unperturbed game such that
A |D] is either nonzero at π 0 or changes sign around π 0 . Then there will be a sequence of equilibria (π n T π n ) of perturbed games converging to (π 0 T π 0 ). In this sense, our analysis is robust to small perturbations in the principal's preferences and in the cost of transfers.
S.A.3 A model of endogenous incompleteness
This paper develops a model of informal contracting when punishments and rewards are not determined by an ex ante optimal contract, but rather are taken ex post and express the moral sentiment of the principal. An important complementary research agenda would be to endogenize whether incentive schemes will be determined ex ante or ex post. Following work by Dye (1985) and Tirole (2009) we briefly outline a simple ad hoc model of boundedly rational contracting in which the trade-off between ex ante and ex post contracting can be expressed.
Consider the problem of a senior executive overseeing two managers. There are three periods t ∈ {0 1 2}. At t = 0, the executive has the possibility to commit to transfers as a function of observables. At time t = 1, a particular environment θ ∈ is selected and becomes common knowledge among players. An environment θ corresponds to both a selection of which manager is the active or the passive player and a specification of the set of outcomes and their distribution (Z θ f θ ). For simplicity we assume that all states θ ∈ occur with the same probability 1/card . In period t = 0, the senior executive can choose the environments θ for which he wants to commit to an ex ante contract and the environments for which he will determine rewards and punishments ex post. We denote by χ(θ) ∈ {0 1} the executive's decision to specify ex ante a contract conditional on environment θ. This comes at a consideration cost k for each environment in which an ex ante contract is specified.
If an ex ante contract is specified conditional on state θ, then the executive obtains an expected payoff V ex ante (θ). In states θ where no ex ante contract is specified, transfers are determined by an equilibrium of the informal justice game studied in this paper. This results in payoffs V ex post (θ). Altogether the senior executive's contract completion decision χ(·) is chosen to maximize
A key aspect of this trade-off is that consideration costs are paid regardless of which state happens. As a result, the senior executive will choose to leave contracts incomplete when the set of relevant environments is large and when the payoffs of informal justice approach those of ex ante contracts, for instance, when justice is intent-based and the information available ex post is sufficiently good. Contracts will be completed at states that are likely to happen and for which informal justice is poorly suited to incentivize good behavior (say negative externality environments with poor ex post information).
Appendix S.B: Proofs
S.B.1 Proofs for Sections 2 and 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Let us begin with point (i). Values V (a T ) obtainable when implementing action a = D are bounded above by V (D 0). Consider the transfer scheme defined ∀z ∈ {−1 1} by T z = −6(γ + z)/(2 + λ). Conditional on actions C and D, payoffs to player A under this transfer scheme are
Therefore, transfer scheme T implements action C and guarantees that there is no difference in expected payoffs across players. The principal's value for implementing action C rather than action D (by an optimal transfer scheme) is bounded below by
where we used the assumption that λ ∈ (0 2). Hence it is always optimal to choose a contract that implements action C. We now turn to point (ii) and set γ = − 1 2 . We know from point (i) that it is optimal to implement action C. The optimal contracting problem boils down to
We only need to show that setting T −1 ≤ 0 cannot be optimal. If this were the case, player A's incentive compatibility (IC) constraint implies that T 1 < 0. Consider increasing T 1 and T −1 by > 0. For small, player A's IC constraint continues to hold and the principal's payoff increases. It follows that the optimal contract must involve setting T −1 > 0.
S.B.2 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider a sequence (π n f n ) n≥0 converging to (π f ) under the L 1 norm. For concision, let T n ≡ T π n f n denote the corresponding transfer scheme. Assume that there exists such that for all n ≥ 0, T π f − T n 1 ≥ . We show that this leads to a contradiction.
We know that transfer scheme T n can be written to take the form
Up to extraction of a subsequence, we can assume that thresholds (θ max − n θ − n θ + n θ max + n ) converge to thresholds (θ max − ∞ θ − ∞ θ + ∞ θ max + ∞ ). As a result transfers T n must converge with μ D and μ C such that μ C + μ D ≤ 2α(2 + λ). For any π(C) ∈ (0 1), solutions to this problem take the following threshold form: there exists θ + > 0 and θ − > 0 such that
Consider a sequence of values (δ n ) n≥0 converging to 0. A reasoning similar to that of Lemma 4 implies that T π δ n must converge to T π δ=0 under the L 1 norm. Limit transfer scheme T π δ=0 exhibits punitive justice at every state z such that T π δ=0 z = 0. In addition, transfers T π δ n converge to T π δ=0 under the L 1 norm. Hence, recalling that L denotes the Lebesgue measure on Z, it must be that for every > 0, It follows from elementary (though tedious) algebra that whenever π(C) > (9α(2 + λ) − 10λ)/(9α(2 + λ) − 4λ), the optimal transfer is T −1 = T 1 = 0. In contrast, whenever π(C) < (9α(2 + λ) − 10λ)/(9α(2 + λ) − 4λ), the optimal transfer sets T −1 ≥ 8/(2 + λ) and T 1 ≤ 0.
For such transfers, E[u T A |C] − E[u T
A |D] ≥ −1 + 4(1 + λ)/(2 + λ) > 0. It follows that the only equilibrium behavior is π(C) = (9α(2 + λ) − 10λ)/(9α(2 + λ) − 4λ).
